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Problems Associated with the 
Growth of International Firms
Professor Edith Penrose 
Professor Penrose, author of a recent book 
“The Large International Firm in Develop­
ing Countries” is Professor of Economics 
at the School of Oriental and African 
Studies of London University.
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL
FIRMS*
EDITH T. PENROSE
The term “international firm” is used in this paper to describe a business 
organization that is engaged in production in a number of countries through 
branches, subsidiaries, or affiliates, which may or may not be separate cor­
porate entities in the several countries in which they operate. The term “organi­
zation” implies that the entire group, including the head office as well as the 
various types of subsidiary units,* 1 is operated within an administrative frame­
work which knits the whole together in such a way that the general policies 
and administrative and financial procedures of the group are reasonably 
consistent and coherent throughout the firm. Individual subsidiaries may have 
considerable autonomy in their own operations, but if they operate entirely 
independently of the group as a whole they are better treated from the point 
of view of the growth of the firm as a simple investment by the parent com­
panies and an extension of its financial influence than as an integral part of the 
industrial organization, or “firm”.2 It should be clear, therefore, that we shall 
not be concerned with financial firms nor with firms that merely import and 
export; we are concerned with firms that engage in production in a number of 
countries and whose activities are organized within a coherent administrative 
framework.
The large international firm has today become one of the most important 
types of international economic organization, dominating a wide variety of 
industries ranging from pharmaceuticals and automobiles to the petroleum 
industry. A very great proportion of these are American, but there are also 
important European firms, including particularly British, Swiss, German, Dutch 
and French, as well as Japanese. Although we speak of international firms 
because of the international spread of their operations, each such firm with 
few exceptions, has a distinct nationality, which is the nationality of the parent 
firm.3 The controlling centre, or head office, is usually located in the country 
in which the parent company is incorporated, the firm having acquired its 
international status by extending its productive operations from its home
* Paper Read to the Society in May, 1969.
1 From now on I shall use the term “subsidiary” to include branches and affiliates as well as true 
subsidiaries, since the distinctions between them are not important for my purposes.
2 The degree of autonomy that can be granted to subsidiaries without destroying the administrative 
coherence of the firm is almost impossible to define in the abstract. The boundaries o f any given 
firm can only be determined with reference to the actual organization of the operations of that 
firm. For further discussion on this point, see my Theory o f the Growth o f the Firm (Oxford, 2nd ed. 
1965).
3 There are exceptions, o f which perhaps the Royal Dutch/Shell is one of the best-known examples. 
This “firm” is not a firm in a formal sense but is a kind o f agreement between two international 
holding companies, the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and Trading Com­
pany, under which the assets o f the firm are held in undivided ownership in the proportions 60% 
Royal Dutch and 40% Shell Transport, with income being divided in the same way as well as mem­
bership in the controlling Board of Directors. This grouping can be called a “ firm” on my definition 
because its activities are carried on within a co-ordinated administrative framework, but it has 
no single nationality and consequently no clear national orientation. I have elsewhere suggested 
that Royal Dutch/Shell, partly because o f its lack o f a distinct nationality, has a more truly inter­
national outlook than that of any other international oil company. See The Large International Firm 
in Developing Countries: The International Petroleum Industry (Allen & Unwin, 1968) p. 109.
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country to other countries. This process, which includes the establishment 
and subsequent expansion of producing units abroad, is called “direct foreign 
investment”, and is usually, though not always, undertaken by enterprises 
that are predominately privately owned. Hence, in discussing problems asso­
ciated with the growth of international firms we are at the same time discussing 
problems of direct foreign investment.
Foreign investment of this kind may be undertaken by a firm for a wide 
variety of reasons: there may be geographical advantages in producing abroad 
which relate to the nature of markets, the existence of raw materials, or the 
availability of other factors of production; there may be a variety of govern­
ment restrictions on trade and payments which make local production economic­
ally advantageous or even necessary; or there may be tax advantages associated 
with production in particular countries. In the space available here it is not 
possible to examine these considerations nor to discuss the entire range of 
problems associated with the growth of firms as they spread activities inter­
nationally. Although many of these problems involve aspects of organization 
and co-ordination, and of adaptation to particular circumstances and markets, 
perhaps the most interesting relate to the peculiar problems a foreign firm may 
face in making itself acceptable to the peoples and governments of the countries 
in which it operates. I shall therefore select for discussion four types of problems 
from the latter category, all of which become more important as a firm grows 
in size, and especially if it comes to account for an increasing proportion of the 
output of an important industry in any particular country.
The first of these problems arises from the significance of transfer pricing, 
since an international firm is, by definition, an integrated firm, and thus there 
is likely to be considerable trade in goods or services between its subsidiaries 
across national frontiers. The second relates to the fact that an international 
firm, especially if it is in the newer technologically progressive industries or 
has access to large economics of scale or unusually extensive financial resources, 
is likely to enjoy a fairly strong monopoly position in its host countries, and 
particularly in the less developed of these countries. The third problem arises 
when the firm produces for the local markets of the host countries and attempts 
to finance local expansion largely from local earnings. Finally, we shall discuss 
the problems that may arise if the firm desires, or is forced, to accept the 
participation of local equity capital or local management.
Transfer Pricing
When a firm establishes manufacturing subsidiaries abroad the new plants 
will, in general, be producing or distributing products similar to those which 
the firm is also producing elsewhere, or will be producing raw or semi-finished 
materials which it uses in its own operations elsewhere. The former is com­
monly known as “horizontal” integration and the latter as “vertical” inte­
gration. Thus, oil companies may establish refineries or distribution networks 
to serve local markets, and import the crude oil or products required, often 
from their own subsidiaries elsewhere, or they may undertake crude-oil pro­
duction largely for the purpose of exporting crude-oil to their own refining 
subsidiaries in other countries. Pharmaceutical companies establish plants 
for the manufacture of drugs in other countries, but often supply raw materials 
or semi-finished products to them from other subsidiaries in other countries. 
In both cases, services such as managerial and technical services and patent 
rights are also made available to subsidiaries, often at a substantial fee.
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For some such products and services, market prices may exist; others 
are of such a specialized nature, or subject to such a degree of monopoly in 
production (e.g., patented products with no close substitutes or, until recently, 
crude-oil outside the United States), that the price at which they are transferred 
between subsidiaries cannot be compared with any reasonably free market 
price. In these circumstances, international firms may possess a very large 
amount of discretion with respect to the prices at which they transfer products 
and services across national frontiers between their subsidiaries. And govern­
ments have a legitimate interest in these prices.
Without entering into the controversy over whether firms actually attempt 
to “maximize” profits, it is probably reasonable to assume that most firms 
like to make as much profit as seems reasonably practicable under the circum­
stances, and that by and large they are interested in profits after taxes on income. 
An international firm is subject to income taxes in many countries and will 
thus have an incentive so to price the products (or services) transferred between 
their subsidiaries as to minimize the total income tax payments for the con­
solidated firm, by allowing as much profit as possible to appear in those countries 
where tax rates are lowest. Thus, there is, in a sense, an in-built incentive to 
discriminate in transfer pricing among the several countries in which the firm 
operates, and such discrimination has often brought international firms into 
conflict with host governments.
The discrimination may be in favour of the home country or in favour of 
certain of the other countries in which subsidiaries are located. The Swiss 
pharmaceutical firms, for example, seem to favour the former, while the inter­
affiliate pricing of crude-oil by the international petroleum companies has 
clearly favoured the crude-oil producing countries.4 In any case, as the firm 
grows in size, the significance of its transfer prices may also increase with respect 
both to the balance of payments of the countries importing or exporting the 
transferred products and to the income tax receipts of their governments (which 
are, of course, interrelated). Problems may arise which can lead to considerable 
public criticism, and sometimes to acute political controversy, with the govern­
ments in the strongest bargaining positions being able to obtain concessions 
which cannot be obtained by weaker governments. Different firms adopt very 
different policies with respect to transfer pricing, including charges to their 
subsidiaries for managerial services, patent rights, etc., but in the absence of 
competitive “arm’s length” market prices, there are no unambiguous criteria 
that firms can use for the determination of what is “fair” to all countries 
concerned.
The Problem of “ Monopoly”
When a firm establishes subsidiaries abroad, it presumably does so because 
it believes that it has some competitive advantage over other actual or potential 
producers. It may possess specialized technological, managerial, financial or 
marketing expertise; it may have been able to acquire some special type of 
protection or privilege from governments (including patent rights) for its 
activities or products; it may operate under private market-sharing arrange­
4 See Ibid., Chapter VI, for a discussion of the petroleum industry. For evidence respecting the 
drug industry see the Report o f the Committee o f Enquiry into the Relationship o f the Pharmaceutical 
Industry with the National Health Service, 1965*1967 (Simsbury Report). London. HMSO. Cmnd. 
3410. 1967. Appendix I, paras. 15, 23.
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ments; or it may simply have a head start over other producers in a market too 
small to support additional efficient producers. Such competitive advantages, 
whether they be attributable to the firm’s own superior efficiency, to govern­
ment policy, or to private monopolistic arrangements, may enable the foreign 
subsidiary to obtain a dominating position in an important industry or even 
in the economy as a whole, of the host country. Such a situation is common in 
developing countries, but it is also important in some industries in industrial 
countries, especially in an industry where patent protection plays an important 
role. Clearly, the expansion of a foreign subsidiary in such circumstances can 
give rise to difficulties with host governments, particularly in countries that 
are sensitive to the prospect of foreign “domination” of their economies.
To the extent that the competitive advantages giving rise to a monopolistic 
position are the result of the superior productive efficiency of the foreign firm, 
the economy of the host country gains even if profits are considerably above 
“normal”, but at the same time the local pricing policy of the firm may come 
under fire as ah example of “foreign exploitation”—perhaps especially, but not 
uniquely, in underdeveloped countries. Again, there is no unambiguous econo­
mically “optimum” policy for the firm to adopt, although so long as the return 
on investment in one country is greater than that to be obtained elsewhere, the 
firm would presumably expand output to the point where returns are roughly 
equalized in each of the countries in which it operates. Some international 
firms apparently attempt to charge approximately the same prices for their 
products all over the world and thus to maintain a world-wide system of prices; 
others seem to price according to the elasticity of demand in different markets 
and thus practice geographical price discrimination. But if the growth of a 
foreign subsidiary increases its monopoly position in particular markets, the 
problem of pricing may become acute partly, if not largely, because the sub­
sidiary is foreign owned, even if we can assume that much of the abnormal 
profit is properly classified as an economic rent attributable to its superior 
factors of production or management rather than to some form of protection 
or private monopoly. The problem here is often one of market structure which 
the firm can do little about, and in the setting of prices for the local market 
the firm may have to take public and government attitudes into consideration 
more than its own commercial interests. These last two are likely, of course, 
to be related.
It is common, however, for governments, especially in the developing 
countries, to insist that some proportion of the profits of foreign firms be 
reinvested in the country, for it is assumed that if the foreign capital is welcomed 
in the first instance as a desirable contribution to the growth of the local 
economy, then any increase in foreign investment that results from the reinvest­
ment of the profits of foreign firms will be equally desirable. This brings us to 
the question of “self-financing”, and the problems this may raise for the posi­
tion of the firm as it expands.
“Self-Financing”
The term “self-financing”, or the financing of investment from retained 
earnings, describes a situation in which a firm raises on a current basis all or 
the greater part of the funds it invests from its customers through the prices 
it charges. The expansion of local subsidiaries can be financed through bor­
rowing from the local market or from abroad, through the issue of equity shares
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in the local market, through additional capital investment from the parent 
company, or, if the profits of the subsidiary are high enough, through the 
reinvestment of these profits. If local equity shares are not issued any expansion 
of the subsidiary will increase the amount of foreign investment by the amount 
of the expansion. Finance through an influx of new investment from the parent 
will increase the foreign exchange receipts of the country concerned over what 
they would have been in the absence of the subsidiary. Finance through bor­
rowing or through the reinvestment of retained earnings does not increase the 
foreign exchange receipts of the country over what they would have been in the 
absence of the firm, but the former permits local lenders to share in the gross 
return on investment, and the latter reduces the amount of foreign payments 
that the country would have had to make in the absence of the reinvestment 
and thus leaves its balance of payments better off, at least in the short run, 
than it would have been.
There are a large number of intricate aspects of these questions which 
cannot be dealt with in the space available here. The policies of different firms 
differ with respect to the weight they give to the desires of the managers of 
their subsidiaries to retain some of their earnings for expansion; the situation 
is different according to the type and amount of outside equity capital in any 
particular subsidiary; and, of great importance, the international firm may 
not itself be free to make its decisions according to its own commercial interests 
because of intervention from its home government as well as intervention 
from the host governments. Moreover, from the point of view of the economic 
effects on the country concerned, it makes a difference whether the foreign 
subsidiary is producing for export or for the local market, that is, whether it 
derives its income primarily or entirely from local sales.
Governments often put pressure on foreign firms to reinvest a substantial 
proportion of their profits, but the effect is, of course, to increase the foreign 
liabilities of the country since eventually dividends will have to be paid on the 
increased amount of foreign investment. This will create few problems if the 
foreign firm itself earns foreign exchange from exports, but if the firm is pro­
ducing for the local market, then the servicing of the investment may at some 
point claim a large proportion of the foreign earnings of the country.5 If the 
profits of the firm are due to its efficiency in production, then in principle the 
increase in the national income of the country due to the firm’s activities will 
leave the country better off even after the payment of dividends abroad. This 
will not necessarily be the case if there is a significant monopoly element in the 
profits.
Moreover, in permitting very large amounts of investment in foreign firms 
producing for the domestic market, a country may find itself very vulnerable to 
sudden changes in the policies of the capital exporting countries respecting their 
own balance of payments. Both the United States and the United Kingdom 
have in recent years requi.ed their own “international” firms to reduce their 
investment abroad, which in many cases means an acceleration of the repatria­
tion of earnings. This is a means of putting pressure on the balance of payments 
of other countries in order to improve their own and may occur at a particu­
larly awkward time from the point of view of the countries in which the sub­
5 An excellent example of this can be found in the experience of General Motors Holden in Aus­
tralia. See my “Foreign Investment and The Growth of the Firm”, Economic Journal, Vol. LXVI, 
June 1956.
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sidiaries of the international firms operate. Foreign firms have been especially 
interested in attempts to create an international “charter” for foreign investors 
to project themselves against arbitrary actions by host governments. They 
should perhaps also protest against arbitrary action by their home governments 
which create a legitimate wariness in receiving countries and to some extent 
justify a refusal on their part to permit the free repatriation of profits in the 
normal course of commercial operations.
It must be remembered, however, that capital may not be the most impor­
tant contribution that a foreign firm makes to the local economy; the inflow of 
managerial skills, technological know-how, and marketing efficiency may be 
much more important and may be the real benefit for which the economy 
pays in the form of repatriated profits. At the same time, as the foreign sub­
sidiary grows, it often trains local people and takes them into the firm, even 
into the positions of top management. In a developed economy, the point may 
be reached at which the subsidiary has become “local” in virtually everything 
but ownership, and if profits are abnormally high the economy may find itself 
paying a high price for capital alone. This may also be the result when an 
international firm expands by taking over a local firm and when the profit­
ability of the take-over rests significantly on monopolistic advantages possessed 
by the international firm, as may be the case, for example, when an American 
oil company takes over a European refinery in order to obtain an outlet at 
non-competitive transfer prices for crude-oil it produces in subsidiaries else­
where.
Partly for reasons such as those discussed above, some countries have 
pressed strongly for the acceptance of local equity in the subsidiaries of foreign 
firms. Others may want and need the foreign managerial and technical skills 
but be reluctant to accept the relatively high cost of equity capital investment 
as well. This brings us to our final set of problems, those associated with a 
fear of foreign domination and control of the local economy.
Local “Participation”
Local participation in ownership and management, or “partnership”, is 
often proposed as a solution to some of the problems we have touched on, 
and some international firms have adopted the general policy as they expand 
abroad of proposing joint ventures with local businessmen. Others have accepted 
local participation under pressure. Except in countries where local managerial 
participation may raise political problems, most large international firms 
today go out of their way to train and accept local people in their managerial 
hierarchy, although “top management” of an international firm is still largely 
confined to the nationals of the home country. As noted above, however, if 
“indigenisation” reaches the point where local subsidiaries are entirely managed 
and staffed by local people, the foreign contribution made by the subsidiary 
to the economy may become reduced to its capital investment and whatever 
benefits may be derived from the remaining links with the parent company. 
These benefits may be considerable, but so may also be the costs, especially if 
problems relating to integration and transfer pricing are important.
The acceptance of local equity raises a different type of problem. In 
particular, it may destroy the coherent administrative character of the inter­
national firm. A wholly-owned subsidiary of an international firm is an integral
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part of an international organization. Its managers may argue strongly and 
effectively in the various committees of the organization for their own views 
and for the interests of their own subsidiaries, but decisions on important 
matters are made by committees representing the firm as a whole, not by these 
managers alone. Usually the use to be made of the profits of the subsidiaries 
is one of these important matters, and the decisions are made in the light of 
the interests of the firm as a whole, as are decisions about large investment 
programmes or about sources of funds. Similarly, high managerial appoint­
ments are matters of concern to the entire firm. But if there exists a consider­
able amount of outside equity, all of these decisions will have to take account 
of the interests and demands of the outside owners, and the problems of 
administration may become magnified. In consequence, decentralisation may 
go so far that it will no longer be possible to treat the entire group as a coherent 
administrative organization falling within the definition of an international 
firm in the sense used here.
Partnerships, or “joint ventures”, are nevertheless often useful means of 
reducing local antagonisms and thus of facilitating the growth of the inter­
national firm. It is sometimes alleged, however, that they bring about a sub­
stitution of local for foreign capital to the disadvantage of the receiving coun­
tries, for when an established firm admits local equity capital by selling shares 
to local investors, it is, in effect, repatriating part of its investment unless the 
new local capital is used for an expansion that would not otherwise have 
taken place. At the same time, it is likely that the supply of local savings for 
investment in countries allegedly “short” of capital is very much a function 
of existing opportunities for profitable investment, and that much saving which 
would otherwise flow in non-productive directions might become available 
for investment if more secure productive openings for local funds were also 
available. The shares of foreign firms could well provide very attractive oppor­
tunities for such savings and thus even increase the total supply of capital in­
stead of merely effecting a substitution of local for foreign capital.
In this short paper I have raised and commented on certain types of 
problems associated with the growth of large international firms; I have pro­
vided no solutions. It is difficult enough to describe both reasonably ade­
quately and also briefly even the nature of the problems, let alone to provide 
solutions. But unless solutions are found to the types of problems discussed 
here, it is highly probable that the acceptability of large international firms, 
already seriously questioned in many countries, will become increasingly 
undermined as they expand operations and grow in importance in more and 
more countries. They may then become little more than international invest­
ment companies whose activities are closely circumscribed by governments 
everywhere. And the fact that American firms are becoming increasingly 
dominant in some areas does not make the problems less difficult.
May, 1969.
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